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UNITED STATES
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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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The Atlantic Alliance

Following is the transcript of a recorded interview between Secretary Dulles and Christopher Serpell, of the British Broadcasting Corporation, which was broadcast on the BBC Home Service on December 3 (press release 650).

Mr. Serpell: Mr. Secretary, would you say that the NATO forthcoming summit meeting which is going to take place in Paris had its origin when Mr. Macmillan came here to see the President?

Secretary Dulles: I think that was the origin. You may recall Mr. Spaak, the Secretary General of NATO, was here at that same time together with President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan. He was so impressed by the statement of principles, the statement of common purpose,¹ which the two Heads of Government had worked out together, that he thought it would be a good idea to bring that same concept, those same ideas, to a meeting in Paris which will be attended by the Heads of Government. So he made that suggestion, but it was inspired by the, I think, really very fine, perhaps you could say almost great, statement of common purpose which was made by those two leaders at that time. It was a very important meeting.

Mr. Serpell: It has been said that the meeting which involves the Heads of State has been rather forced on the Atlantic alliance by the successes of the Soviet Union, successes in capturing the initiative in the military, technological, and even the political fields. Would you agree with that point of view?

Secretary Dulles: No, I wouldn't agree with it. At least, that is only a partial and quite inadequate statement. It is always true that a despotism which can control the lives, the efforts, the resources of many millions of people can achieve a certain kind of initiative, particularly when it is

an atheistic, materialistic society such as the Soviet Communist leadership is. But to have that kind of initiative is by no means to have all the initiative there is. There is a terrific initiative also which lies in freedom, the love of people to manage their own affairs, control their own destiny, to have a choice as to what they do, to have freedom of thought, and that initiative is with and rests with the free nations. And I believe in the long run that is going to be the initiative that is going to dominate.

Mr. Serpell: The Foreign Minister of Germany, Herr von Brentano, when he left said that one of the main purposes of his visit to Washington had been to advocate greater discussion of political problems within NATO, and then, of course, ever since Mr. Macmillan was here, there has been much talk about interdependence. Do you think steps should be taken at Paris to provide for greater consultation between the NATO countries over such political problems as Cyprus, Algeria, or again this recent question of the supply of arms to Tunisia—consultation, I mean, before any one member of the alliance takes off on some policy of its own?

Secretary Dulles: Well, that is a rather long question, Mr. Serpell. I may have to divide up my answer a little bit. Now, there was recognition here in the Declaration of Common Purpose by President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan of the United Kingdom of this concept of interdependence, and that was extremely important. It's really nothing new. But the nations of the West had been drawing together, closer and closer, and ought to do so because there have been divisions within the West that are the cause of so much of the trouble in the world today. That is an evolutionary process that is going on, and it is going to be advanced further at this forthcoming meeting. Now, part of that should be increased consultation, and there

¹ BULLETIN of Nov. 11, 1957, p. 739.

will be increased consultation. That doesn't mean that everything should be brought up and discussed around the NATO table.

You talked about three specific cases, I recall. One was Cyprus, the other was Algeria, and the other was Tunis—arms to Tunis. Now, of course, there is a great deal of consultation that has been going on about all three of those matters. It has not always been discussed, indeed very little discussed, actually around the NATO table. But there has been diplomatic consultation going on with the Greeks, the Turks, and the United Kingdom about the future of Cyprus. There were discussions with the United Kingdom, France, the United States, and Tunisia with regard to arms to Tunisia. There have been discussions about Algeria. Sometimes these things can be better discussed around the Council table of NATO—sometimes perhaps not. It is, I think, a fact there could usefully be more discussion than there has been heretofore. As you perhaps know, Mr. Spaak, the Secretary General of NATO, is himself giving some attention to the Cyprus matter. And perhaps some of these things could better be discussed around the table with all 15 countries, but that doesn't necessarily follow. The habit of consultation is a good one—there should be consultation. Just how, where, and when it should take place is a matter for which there should be, I think, some flexibility.

Interlocking of Regional Pacts

Mr. Serpell: Of course, NATO is only one of the so-called security systems which exist in the world today. SEATO, for example, is another. Do you think, Mr. Secretary, there is any possibility at the present time of creating one worldwide security system for the free nations which might substitute for these regional pacts, which do not always have the same membership?

Secretary Dulles: I doubt that is in the immediate future. Of course, the United Nations itself was designed to be a worldwide security system or to provide one. The articles of the charter provided that the Security Council should have these forces available to it in order to maintain peace and suppress acts of aggression anywhere in the world. Now, the Soviets blocked that, and because they blocked it by their veto power, it has been necessary for other states to draw together, to exercise what is called in the charter the in-

herent right of collective self-defense. And, as you point out, that is primarily along regional lines. Now, in theory, you could bring them all together. But the disadvantage of doing that is, if you did it, you almost would create a rival organization to the United Nations. The United Nations is so important, and does so much good, that anything which looks as though it was a rival to the United Nations, which was going to detract from the influence and power of the United Nations, would, I think, be unfortunate. So I think we will probably still continue for the immediate future in terms of these regional groups. Perhaps there could be and should be a greater interlocking; perhaps observers of one group could be present in another. In fact, as you point out, they have a common interest oftentimes, and if a war broke out of major proportions in any part of the world, it would probably spread everywhere. So they do have a common interest, and some way must be found to keep them in contact with each other.

There is, of course, a certain amount of interlocking membership. The United Kingdom or the United States between them are members of all these organizations, NATO, the Baghdad Pact, SEATO, the Organization of American States, the British Commonwealth of Nations. So there is a certain interlocking which takes place already through the membership particularly of the United Kingdom and the United States.

Mr. Serpell: Coming back to the Paris meeting, some people here have been saying that too much emphasis is being placed both in Washington and in London on the military aspects of the Soviet threat to the free world today and not enough on the economic and political penetration by the Russians. How would you view this criticism, and how do you expect to meet nonmilitary penetration?

Secretary Dulles: I think that perhaps the public does attach a great deal of importance, perhaps excessive importance, to the military aspects. I notice myself, if I make a speech, if I say anything about the military in the speech, that is immediately reported in the press and oftentimes it will make a headline. What I say about nonmilitary seldom, I am afraid, gets reported in the press, and that is typical, I think, of the way these things go. The military seems to catch the public imagination and it is played up by the press much

more than the nonmilitary, and that is unfortunate. But that fact of the way it is portrayed is not the way we actually feel. I know in this country—and I am pretty sure it is the same in the United Kingdom and the other countries—we feel that the nonmilitary aspects of this problem are just as important as the military. And, indeed, if you look at what's happened over the last few years, you will see the actual gains that the Soviet Union has made, the countries it has taken over, had almost all been taken over by measures other than by direct military force. There has been military force employed—it was employed against Finland; it was employed against Poland; it was employed against Korea. But by and large their great successes have been gained by nonmilitary means. And it is very important that we shouldn't get our eyes so fixed on the skies, on sputnik, that we forget what's actually going on under foot, and that is the political, economic, psychological warfare which they are carrying on. And we must be prepared to meet that by our own programs. We are attaching a great deal of importance to that. We have quite a program. The United Kingdom has a program—take the Colombo Plan in which the British Commonwealth nations participate. Things of that sort are of the utmost importance and must not be forgotten as we think about guided missiles and things of that sort.

Limited Value of Conferences With U.S.S.R.

Mr. Serpell: A good many people have been repeating in Washington and in London, more than once, that there is nothing now to be gained by holding conferences directly with the Russians. Do you think this attitude might give the impression, particularly perhaps to the noncommitted countries like India, that Western policy is too much on the defensive? Some people have suggested that there would be a purpose in taking the initiative, by proposing talks with the Russians on some specific and limited issue, for instance, on the supply of arms to the Middle East. What are your reactions to that suggestion?

Secretary Dulles: Well, I think perhaps I am the world's greatest expert on conferences with the Russians because, excluding meetings at the United Nations, I have attended myself no less than 12 such conferences beginning in 1945 and up to the last year. Now I am bound to say that

very little has come out of these conferences, primarily because the Soviets cannot be relied upon to live up to their promises. And when you can't put faith and trust in a nation's promises, conferences produce very little.

Now you had the summit conference, which was the most advertised of them all, and what came out of that? An agreement by Khrushchev and Bulganin that Germany should be reunified by free elections. That was about the only specific thing that came out of that conference. And that was torn up almost within weeks after the promise was made. I don't see a great purpose in having conferences where you can't rely upon agreements unless you can enforce them. There may be a few cases—there are—where you can usefully have agreements. As a matter of fact, we are discussing here now in the State Department agreements to have certain cultural exchanges. They'll be on a sort of a man-for-man basis so that, if they don't live up to their promise, then we don't perform on our side—it is a sort of a cash-on-the-barrelhead operation. That kind of thing is all right. We have an agreement in Korea, an armistice agreement. That is all right up to the point where we enforce it. Every provision of that armistice agreement that we cannot enforce ourselves by our own military positions—the Koreans and ourselves along the armistice line—they violate. We did achieve the elimination of the occupation of Austria, but that was not arrived at at a conference table. There were, I suppose, several hundred conferences held on that very subject—a state treaty for Austria. When they finally decided to do it, they didn't do it at a conference table; they just decided to do it because they were under such pressure of world opinion that they thought it was the expedient thing for them to do.

Now, I don't exclude conferences at all. But I do say that the values you can get out of a conference are greatly limited when you cannot depend upon the other man's promises. The whole record of the Soviet Union in respect to broken promises is a very lamentable one. And, indeed, they are a nation—perhaps the first nation—which has turned treaty-breaking into a regularly accepted means of gaining their ends in the world. So we have to be very careful, and the areas where you can usefully reach agreement are quite limited. We are, of course, trying to get a disarmament agreement, eagerly want one, but

that would be acceptable only to the extent that we can have observations, controls, etc., to be sure that the Russians are living up to their side of the bargain. That is the aspect which they themselves do not want to accept.

Mr. Serpell: One last question on this subject of the Russians, Mr. Secretary. The United States has, of course, a record for anticolonial policy, and in Britain and in France it is sometimes felt—and particularly in the years since the war many people feel—that the present brand of Russian imperialism is a greater and more immediate threat to the peoples of the world. What is your thinking on these two counts?

Secretary Dulles: I think that the colonialism or imperialism, whatever you want to call it, of the Soviet Union is infinitely worse than any of the forms of conventional colonialism that still exist in the world. There is very little of that when you think that 20 nations have been freed with a total population of nearly a billion people over the last few years. That evolution has been tremendous. It contrasts very strikingly with the fact that during the same period of time the Soviets have made themselves the master of about the same number of people who have lost their freedom and liberty. There is still a little colonialism left, but it is very carefully supervised by the United Nations—the Trusteeship Council. While there is something still to be done there, that is in the process of doing, there is an evolution going on. In the case of the Soviet Union, there is no evolution going on at all toward independence that they can stop. A good exhibit of that was a year ago this time in Hungary when the desire of the people to be free was suppressed so cruelly by the Soviet tanks.

Mr. Serpell: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Arthur S. Osborne Appointed to South Pacific Commission

The White House announced on December 3 that President Eisenhower has appointed Arthur S. Osborne to be an alternate U.S. Commissioner on the South Pacific Commission for a term of 2 years, vice Curtis C. Strong, term expired.

Mutual Security Coordination and Development Loan Fund

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

White House (Gettysburg, Pa.) press release dated November 30

The President has issued an Executive order respecting the mutual security programs which puts into effect certain arrangements relating to loans from the newly established Development Loan Fund and, further, gives the Secretary of State greater flexibility in the organization of mutual security responsibilities and activities within the Department of State.

The mutual security legislation enacted this year provides that the President shall constitute a loan committee consisting of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs as chairman, the Director of the International Cooperation Administration, and the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank. The law also vests in the President the authority to make loan commitments and to perform related actions in connection with the Development Loan Fund. The Executive order constitutes the loan committee and delegates the Presidential functions to the Secretary of State.

Previous Executive orders, which delegate various responsibilities with respect to mutual security programs to the Secretary of State, have imposed certain restrictions upon the Secretary in assigning responsibilities or in organizing mutual security activities within the Department of State. The Executive order issued will eliminate such restrictions and thereby permit the Secretary of State to rearrange mutual security responsibilities so as to effect such arrangements as he finds necessary to achieve greater efficiency and economy or more effective coordination of mutual security activities with related foreign policies and programs. It is, however, the intention of the Secretary to retain the International Cooperation Administration as a separate operating agency in the Department of State.

Extensive preliminary activities looking toward the making of loans from the Development Loan Fund have been carried on since the enactment of the Mutual Security Act of 1957. The order provides the basic Presidential actions necessary to commence the actual making of such loans.

EXECUTIVE ORDER 10742¹

FURTHER PROVIDING FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF FOREIGN-AID FUNCTIONS

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Mutual Security Act of 1954 (68 Stat. 832), as amended, including particularly sections 521 and 525 thereof, and as President of the United States, it is ordered as follows:

Section 1. Executive Order No. 10575 of November 6, 1954 (19 F. R. 7249),² as amended or affected by Executive Order No. 10610 (20 F. R. 3179),³ Executive Order No. 10625 (20 F. R. 5571),⁴ and Executive Order No. 10663 (21 F. R. 1845),⁵ is hereby further amended as follows:

(a) Section 101(b) is amended (1) by deleting from the first sentence "sections 402, 505, and 201 of the Act" and inserting in lieu thereof "sections 402 and 505 of the Act", (2) by deleting from the second sentence "sections 201(a) and 505 of", and (3) by deleting from the third sentence "the said section 505" and inserting in lieu thereof "section 505 of the Act".

(b) Section 103(a) (2) is amended to read as follows: "(2) The functions conferred upon the President by sections 105 (b) (3), 202, 204, 405 (a), 413 (b) (2) and (3), and 529 (b) and (c) of the Act."

(c) A new section 108 is inserted after section 107, reading as follows:

"Section 108. *Development Loan Committee.* There is hereby established, in accordance with section 205 (b) of the Act, the Development Loan Committee, consisting of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, who shall be chairman, the Director of the International Cooperation Administration, and the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank."


Section 2. Executive Order No. 10610 of May 9, 1955 (20 F. R. 3179), as amended or affected by Executive Order No. 10625 (20 F. R. 5571), and Executive Order No. 10663 (21 F. R. 1845), is hereby further amended as follows:

(a) Section 103(a) is amended to read as follows:

"Section 103. (a) The Secretary of State shall establish, with the offices, personnel, and facilities transferred to the Department of State by or under sections 102(a) and 302 of this order, an agency in the Department of State which shall be known as the International Cooperation Administration. The agencies transferred by sections 102(b), (c), and (d) of this order shall be made a part of or attached to the International Cooperation Administration. The International Cooperation Administration shall be headed by the Director of the International Cooperation Administration referred to in the first sentence of section 103(b) of this order. Except as may be otherwise provided by the Secretary of State, the functions transferred by section 101 hereof shall be carried out by or under the International Cooperation Administration or the Director thereof. The said Admin-

istration and all functions, officers, and agencies transferred by this Part shall be subject to the direction and control of the Secretary of State. This order shall not preclude the Secretary of State from transferring elsewhere in the Department of State the transferred offices, personnel, facilities, and agencies referred to in the first and second sentences of this section. To such extent as the Secretary of State shall prescribe, consistent with law, (1) the International Cooperation Administration and any other agencies of the Department of State designated by the Secretary of State shall be deemed to be the successors of the Foreign Operations Administration in respect of transfers to the Department of State made by this order, and (2) the Director of the International Cooperation Administration and any other officers of the Department of State designated by the Secretary of State shall be deemed to be the successors of the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration in respect of transfers to the Secretary of State made by this order."

(b) Subsections (b) and (c) of section 104 are hereby revoked.



THE WHITE HOUSE,
November 29, 1957.

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

Press release 658 dated December 6

Secretary Dulles on December 6 issued delegations of authority which (a) vest coordinating responsibility with reference to mutual security programs in the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, (b) continue the operating responsibilities of the Director of the International Cooperation Administration for the major nonmilitary mutual security programs, and assign various responsibilities with respect to the Development Loan Fund to the Director of the International Cooperation Administration.

This action is taken pursuant to an Executive order issued November 29 by the President. The Executive order specifically delegates various Presidential authorities with reference to the Development Loan Fund to the Secretary of State. The Executive order also revises previous delegations of mutual security responsibilities so as to give the Secretary of State full freedom to redelegate or reorganize within the Department of State.

The new arrangement for coordination of mutual security programs is the result of a reappraisal of previous coordinating arrangements.

¹ 22 Fed. Reg. 9689.

² BULLETIN of Dec. 13, 1954, p. 914.

³ *Ibid.*, May 30, 1955, p. 889.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Aug. 15, 1955, p. 273.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Apr. 16, 1956, p. 651.

This reappraisal was called for by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in explaining the provisions in the mutual security legislation of this year which place coordinating responsibility directly in the Secretary of State. The new arrangement is likewise consistent with the views expressed by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in commenting on these same legislative provisions.

Under the Mutual Security Act of 1951, coordinating responsibilities for the mutual security program were originally placed in the Director for Mutual Security, who was in the Executive Office of the President. In 1953 the Director of Foreign Operations succeeded the Director for Mutual Security and, as part of his duties, assumed these responsibilities. In 1955 the Foreign Operations Administration, which had been an independent Government agency, was succeeded by the International Cooperation Administration, a semiautonomous agency within the Department of State, and the Director of ICA took over the coordinating responsibilities.

The action now taken by the Secretary of State in effect separates the function of overall coordination of military and economic assistance from the operation of the ICA assistance programs. Also, this new delegation along with various other existing delegations to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs will permit a broader coordination of mutual security programs with other related foreign policies and programs. Thus not only is coordinating responsibility shifted from the operating head of the International Cooperation Administration to a central policymaking official of the Department; it is also broadened in scope.

While the ICA Director will be freed of general coordinating responsibilities, he and his staff will have the responsibility for working with the Department of Defense in the detailed interrelationship of military assistance with other mutual security programs. The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and the ICA Director, will provide policy guidance, assure this more detailed coordination, and provide the resolution of issues.

The Director of the International Cooperation Administration will continue to be responsible

for a wide range of programs in addition to certain new activities. The Development Loan Fund, for example, is a new activity whose management is located in the International Cooperation Administration. The ICA Director is likewise in charge of technical assistance, special economic assistance, and defense support. Also, where agricultural surplus sales abroad result in loans for developmental purposes, the ICA Director has a primary responsibility. In addition, the ICA Director participates in various major interagency committees concerned with mutual security and foreign economic policy. Thus the ICA Director, subject to the coordination and guidance of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, will have the supervision of the vast and complex operations of the International Cooperation Administration and other related responsibilities.

Under previous Executive orders, the Secretary of State did not have the authority to make rearrangements within the Department of State with respect to mutual security functions and responsibilities. Under the new Executive order, the Secretary is enabled to take such action. At the recommendation of the Director of the International Cooperation Administration, with the concurrence of the Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, for example, action is now being taken to transfer from the International Cooperation Administration to the Bureau of European Affairs various responsibilities for United States participation in the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). This illustrates the kind of organizational change which can be effected.

On November 29 the President, by Executive order, constituted the Development Loan Committee with the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs as chairman and, as members, the Director of the International Cooperation Administration and the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank. The President also specifically delegated his functions with respect to the Development Loan Fund to the Secretary of State. The Secretary's action in delegating these functions to the Director of the International Cooperation Administration, subject to policy guidance received from the Development Loan Committee, will now enable the fund to move into full operation. On December 5 the President appointed Dempster McIntosh to serve

as manager of the loan fund in ICA. Mr. McIntosh, under the direction of the Director of ICA, will have immediate responsibility for the operation of the fund.

The action taken on December 6 basically completes a reorganization of mutual security responsibilities within the Department of State that has been under study by Secretary Dulles for some time. James H. Smith, Jr., recently appointed Director of the International Cooperation Administration, and Douglas Dillon, Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, will work closely with Under Secretary of State Christian A. Herter. Mr. Herter's participation and interest in the foreign assistance programs has been longstanding. As a member of the House of Representatives in 1947 he served as vice chairman of a 19-member Select Committee on Foreign Aid. He led the overseas study conducted by this group, which became widely known as the Herter committee. Its report served as the basis of the original Marshall Plan legislation.

SEATO Seminar Completes Study of Communist Threat

Following is the text of a final communique issued at Baguio, the Philippines, on November 29 at the close of a Southeast Asia Treaty Organization seminar on countering Communist subversion.

The SEATO seminar on countering Communist subversion, the first international seminar of its kind ever held, concluded four days of fruitful meetings here today. President Carlos P. Garcia of the Philippines opened the seminar on Tuesday morning, November 26. Acting Secretary of Foreign Affairs Felixberto M. Serrano of the Philippines delivered the closing address this afternoon.

During the seminar, officials, educators, publicists, leaders of public opinion, trade union leaders and other representatives from the eight SEATO member countries—Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States—conducted the most intensive and thorough study of the Communist threat in Southeast Asia yet undertaken by an international group. The discussions in plenary and committee meetings covered all aspects of Communist subversion.

Communist techniques and activities in the economic, political, cultural and psychological fields were assessed and the most effective countermeasures considered. The Communist threat to the internal security of free countries in Southeast Asia and the best methods of countering that threat were likewise considered.

The main purposes of the seminar were: (1) to focus appropriate public attention on the nature and extent of Communist subversion, one of the major threats to the security and independence of free countries in Southeast Asia; and (2) to assist in the general SEATO effort to expose and counter Communist attempts to extend their power and influence in the treaty area.

The findings of the seminar provide a basis for intensified effort to counter Communist subversion by SEATO as an organization and by the member countries acting individually or in concert. One of the most useful results of the seminar will be to rally public support on a wider scale behind that effort.

Brig. General Pelagio A. Cruz of the Philippines was the Director of the seminar. Mr. Asa Evans of the United States was Deputy Director.

The following participated in the seminar: Representatives of the SEATO member countries Ambassador Keith C. Shann of Australia, Ambassador Georges Cattand of France, Mr. Brian Lendrum of New Zealand, Ambassador Pier Ali Mohammed Rashdi of Pakistan, Senator Gil Puyat of the Philippines, Police Major-General Chamras Mandukananda of Thailand, Ambassador George L. Clutton of the United Kingdom, and Minister Horace H. Smith of the United States.

Three observers from South Vietnam attended the seminar: Dr. Tran Kim Tuyen, Mr. Tran Van Phuoc and Mr. Nguyen Thai Lai.

The following speakers addressed the seminar: Mr. William Worth, Acting Secretary General of SEATO; Prof. Richard L. Walker, Prof. George E. Taylor and Admiral Arthur Radford of the United States; Mr. Richard Thistlethwaite, Mr. Douglas Hyde and Ambassador George L. Clutton of the United Kingdom; Dr. Lloyd Ross and Ambassador Keith C. Shann of Australia; Dr. Luang Suriyabongsas Pisuthipataya of Thailand; Defense Secretary Jesus Vargas and Mr. Tarciano Rizal of the Philippines; and Mr. Jezzo Platthy and Czaba Mezei of Hungary.

Soviet Strategy in the Arab-Israel Problem: A Lesson for the Free World

by James M. Ludlow

United Nations Adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs¹

Twelve years ago today the charter of the United Nations became the world's effective instrument for achieving and maintaining international peace with justice. The preamble of the charter, after indicating the aspirations for which the United Nations stand, states that "and for these ends . . . to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security." At the time that the charter came into effect, it had been signed by 51 nations, who, in signing, had indicated their determination to unite their strength.

The charter has now been signed by 82 nations, and it is still the indicated intention of those nations to unite their strength to maintain international peace and security.

History has demonstrated in the past 12 years that, whereas the overwhelming majority of the signers of the charter were determined to abide by it and make it the means for securing international peace and security, some few nations have not had any such intention. Because of that fact many of the noble objectives of the United Nations have not been achieved and international peace and security too often still hang in the balance.

We are meeting together here because we have common purposes.

First of all, we are here because of our interest in and concern for continued United States leadership in the free world.

Secondly, we are here because of our interest in and concern for the free world.

Thirdly, we are here because of our interest in and concern for the United Nations as the means

of uniting our strength to maintain international peace and security and thus preserve the free world.

Those of us here assembled clearly prove the first interest and concern. We here demonstrate the understanding of the interdependence of the United States and the other free nations, since we know that neither can safely hope to exist without the other. Finally, we are here in the belief that the United Nations is the best available means of preserving the free world.

I have said that we are assembled here in a belief in the United Nations. I contend that that belief is justified. Let the critics scoff! The truth is that the United Nations *is* the means of *uniting* our strength through *learning* and *living* together to preserve the free world. These two processes, however slow and painful, go hand in hand. We Americans—and all peoples everywhere who would be free—are, through the United Nations, *learning together* the designs of those who do not want the world free—the Soviet Communists. We Americans and all peoples who would be free, and remain free, are living together and *must* live together to thwart these Communists' designs. We have been living together now as free nations in the United Nations for 12 years.

With increasing wisdom and cooperation, we may hope for an eternity ahead. What is important *if* this eternity is to be realized is that the learning-together process must proceed and accelerate. It is on one lesson for the free world that I wish to base my remarks tonight.

The Middle East is on the minds of all of us today. Not only is it on our minds and the minds of the peoples in the area, but it is currently uppermost in the minds of the Soviet rulers. (I would

¹Address made before the Mayor's Committee for the Observance of United Nations Day at Milwaukee, Wis., on Oct. 24.

hasten to add—with regard to the Soviet rulers, this is no recent development.) Because the Middle East is the area where freedom may either stand or fall, it might be well to refresh our memories and thereby learn together what has happened in the United Nations concerning Soviet designs in just one facet of relations in the Middle East, and that is the Arab-Israel problem.

Even a cursory discussion—which is all that can be given to this problem tonight—can amply demonstrate what we free people here and in the Middle East have learned and must learn of Soviet strategy and intrigue.

The Partition Plan for Palestine

Perhaps the first major responsibility with which a young and, therefore, vigorous—though inexperienced—United Nations was confronted was the problem of what to do with the Palestine mandated area. Having said that the United Nations was then young, vigorous, and inexperienced, I do not mean to suggest that much prayerful thought and deliberation did not go into the majority decision of the General Assembly on November 29, 1947, calling for the partition of the Palestine Mandate area and the creation of a Jewish state and an Arab state with economic union.

A recollection of history and a look at the record makes it quite clear that the motives of the majority of the members of the General Assembly, in endorsing the Partition Plan, were of the highest nature. The Partition Plan, as adopted, actually represented years of careful thought—even during the time that the area was a mandate—as to how best to solve the problems of Arabs and Jews living together in such a small and economically unviable area. The decision of the British Government to give up the Palestine Mandate produced the urgent need for a decision as to what must be done with Palestine. These plans and thoughts lay behind the adoption of the Partition Plan. Nevertheless, as we look back on history now, one cannot but be struck with the fact that, with the adoption of this Partition Plan and with the early clear indications that it *never* could be implemented, the Soviet Union was handed a golden opportunity to perpetuate a dispute to the detriment of the area and of the world.

Let us now look back through the records of the long and earnest labors in the United Nations

General Assembly and Security Council and summarize therefrom what have been the roles of the United States—and, I might add, of virtually all other members of the two United Nations bodies—on the one hand, and the Soviet Union on the other.

The Record of the United States

As far as the United States has been concerned, from the time fighting broke out in Palestine and it became apparent that the Partition Plan could not be implemented peacefully, it has been the determined policy of the United States to seek every appropriate occasion in the United Nations and with the parties themselves to bring about a just and peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute. It was in pursuance of this policy that early in 1948 the United States announced its view that the Partition Plan was unenforceable. It, therefore, suggested that the United Nations consider the establishment of a temporary trusteeship over the area until a more lasting arrangement could be worked out. It strongly supported the action of the special session of the General Assembly in May 1948 to set up a Mediator for the dispute. The United States lent the Mediator all the support he requested. It supported his proposed settlement, alternative to that in the Partition Plan, and, when this failed to achieve the necessary support in the General Assembly, the United States supported the creation of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, of which it has been a member.

During 1948 and ever since, the United States has initiated or cosponsored virtually all Security Council resolutions calling for the establishment of cease-fires, truces, and Council action supporting the General Armistice Agreements and the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization.

With the negotiation of the General Armistice Agreements, during the first half of 1949, general fighting in the Palestine area came to an end. However, with the discouraging results in efforts to achieve more lasting arrangements than the Armistice Agreements, it soon became the firm policy of the United States, as indicated by every session of the Security Council on the dispute since August 1949, that the parties to the General Armistice Agreements should live up to the letter and spirit of these Armistice Agreements as the means of insuring the tranquillity and relative

stability of the area. As the enforcement agency provided for in the General Armistice Agreements, and as the enforcement agency of the Security Council, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine has received vigorous support from the United States. It has been the position of the United States that the Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), and particularly its Chief of Staff, should have the unstinting support not only of the Security Council but of the parties themselves.

There have been, unfortunately, many serious violations of these Armistice Agreements which have required consideration of the Security Council. In every instance the United States has taken the position that the parties to the Armistice Agreements must comply with the terms of the Armistice Agreements and must resort to the remedial procedures provided for in the Agreements. Each Armistice Agreement has such remedial procedures, some more detailed than others.

Finally, as a result of the Palestine hostilities in 1948, a critical Arab refugee problem was created. The United States was in the forefront of establishing ways and means for caring for these refugees and, since 1949, has contributed nearly \$200 million for the relief and rehabilitation of these refugees, who now number nearly a million.

Now let us contrast *this* record with that of the Soviet Union. It can be summed up in one sentence: The Soviet Union has sought to penetrate the area by many means, including two basic stratagems in the United Nations designed to insure that the dispute remained unresolved.

First Soviet Stratagem: To Let Fighting Continue

The first Soviet stratagem has been to let the parties fight on. The proof lies in a review of the record: From the outset of the dispute in 1947, it was clear to all—and certainly to the Soviets—that, in the face of opposition to carrying out the Partition Plan, fighting was inevitable. Despite this, for the first year the Soviet Union representatives insisted in the General Assembly and the Security Council that the Partition Plan had to be implemented. Any consideration of other possible means of resolving the dilemma were “diversionary” or designed to cloak “Western imperialist” interests in the area.

They, therefore, resisted the calling of a special session of the General Assembly to review the Palestine Partition Plan in April 1948. They opposed the creation of the Mediator for Palestine, and, as long as Count Bernadotte was the Mediator, they resisted all proposals and recommendations he made on the ground that what should be done in solving the Palestine problem was to proceed with the Partition Plan.

As history sadly records, fighting in the Palestine area broke out early in 1948 and continued in varying intensity through that year until negotiations started on the General Armistice Agreements between Israel and the surrounding Arab states.

What was the position of the Soviet Union with regard to this fighting?

It abstained on Security Council resolutions of April 17 and May 22, 1948, which called upon the factions of Palestine to cease acts of violence and to refrain from bringing armament or armed forces into the area.

It did vote for the Security Council's cease-fire resolution of May 29, 1948. This resolution also called for an embargo on the importation of arms and military personnel and instructed the Mediator to supervise the observance of the cease-fire. This favorable Soviet vote—the only one the Soviets ever made—came immediately after a Soviet-sponsored cease-fire had failed to receive the necessary majority vote. Even usually agile Communist dialectics could not justify such an immediate reversal, and the Soviet representative *had* to vote favorably this one time.

It abstained on June 2 on a proposal of the Mediator that he be authorized to fix an effective date for a truce between the parties and fix the duration of that truce.

It abstained on July 7 on a proposal to extend the truce.

It abstained on a resolution of July 15 constituting the cease-fire order which still governs the relations between Israel and the surrounding Arab states.

It abstained on a resolution of August 19 calling for the parties in the Jerusalem area to insure against violations of the truce.

It abstained on a resolution of November 4 calling for the withdrawal of troops to lines held a month earlier before serious fighting had recommenced.

It abstained on a resolution of December 29 calling for the cessation of fighting in the Negev.

But this was not the end—

This policy of *not* standing in the way of fighting in the area continued even after the Armistice Agreements. Thus, for example, when serious fighting broke out between Syria and Israel in May 1951, the Soviet Union abstained on a Security Council resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire. The Soviet representative blandly gave as the reason for his abstention the fact that the resolution referred to several previous resolutions on which the Soviet Union had abstained.

It is logical to draw from this record that the Soviet Union, while not wishing to take overt responsibility for continued fighting which a veto would have implied has never been averse to having the fighting continued and, accordingly, has not been prepared to align itself on the side of stopping the fighting.

Second Soviet Stratagem: Limiting U.N. Efforts

The second stratagem of the Soviet Union has been to limit, if not destroy, the effectiveness of any United Nations effort in settling the dispute.

I have already alluded to the fact that the Soviets opposed the setting up of a Mediator.

The Soviet Union abstained on a resolution to create the truce organization in April 1948 which was designed to bring about an end to the fighting and violence in the Palestine area.

At the December 1948 session of the General Assembly, the Soviet Union strongly opposed the creation of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, but not before it had suggested that the Commission should be constituted on such a geographical basis as to permit Soviet participation. In subsequent sessions of the General Assembly, Soviet representatives have taken numerous opportunities to advocate the abolition of the Palestine Conciliation Commission without regard for what might be the means for possible further negotiations between the parties.

It abstained on the Security Council resolution of August 11, 1949, whereby the Security Council assumed jurisdiction over the General Armistice Agreements, which the Acting Mediator, Dr. Ralph Bunche, had finished negotiating between Israel and the surrounding Arab states. That resolution also made the Chief of Staff of the

Truce Supervision Organization and the observers agents of the Council.

The Soviet representative urged that, since the General Armistice Agreements had been reached, the Palestine Conciliation Commission, which had been set up by the General Assembly the previous December, should be abolished and the United Nations truce observers in Palestine should be recalled and disbanded. All the responsibilities of the Mediator, the truce observers, and the Conciliation Commission could and should devolve upon the parties to the Armistice Agreements themselves. This Soviet proposal was made in the face of the fact that the Soviet Union knew that the Palestine Conciliation Commission could not be abolished by the Security Council since it was a subsidiary body of the General Assembly.

It abstained on a resolution of November 17, 1950, which was cosponsored by the United States, and which sought to support the role of the Chief of Staff in settling the disputes between Egypt and Israel on the one hand and between Jordan and Israel on the other.

It abstained on a resolution of May 18, 1951, wherein the authority of the Chief of Staff over the Syria-Israel Demilitarized Zone was affirmed.

It abstained on a resolution of September 1, 1951, calling upon Egypt to lift restrictions on shipping through the Suez Canal.

The Soviet Union abstained on the resolution of November 24, 1953, which resulted in the censure of Israel for the Qibya raid by the armed forces of Israel on October 14 and 15, 1953. This resolution also, among other things, recalled the obligations of the parties to prevent acts of violence; called upon them to cooperate fully with the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization; and requested the Secretary-General to consider, with the Chief of Staff, ways and means of strengthening the Truce Supervision Organization.

On January 22, 1954, the Soviet Union undertook to veto a resolution relating to steps designed to reaffirm the authority of the Chief of Staff in the Syria-Israel Demilitarized Zone.

On March 27, 1954, the second resolution of the Security Council relating to the Egyptian restrictions on shipping in the Suez Canal was vetoed by the Soviet Union. This resolution called upon Egypt to comply with the resolution of September

1, 1951, on which, as already pointed out, the Soviet Union had abstained.

What the Soviet Union Voted For

In fairness to the Soviet Union, I want to mention, also, the measures they voted *for*.

In March 1955 the Soviet Union voted *for* a resolution which authorized the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization to undertake certain negotiations with the parties designed to insure more effective security arrangements along the Egypt-Israel demarcation lines. Both Egypt and Israel indicated general support for this resolution, but, in noting this fact, the Soviet representative took the occasion to make a vitriolic attack on Turkey and military alliances alleging that they were the real cause of tension in the area.

On September 8, 1955, following serious border incidents between Egypt and Israel, the Soviet Union voted *for* a resolution which continued the efforts of the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization authorized by the previous resolution of March 30, 1955. Mr. Sobolev pled for the restoration of peace and tranquillity on the Egyptian-Israel frontier. That plea, however, was being made at the very time that the Soviet Union was concluding its well-known arms deal with the Egyptian Government.

As perhaps its most notable gesture of unanimity, the Soviet Union voted *for* a United States-sponsored resolution of April 4, 1956, whereby the Secretary-General was requested to go to the Palestine area to survey the enforcement problems in connection with the Armistice Agreements and the Council's resolutions and to undertake certain negotiations with the parties to the Armistice Agreements designed to insure more effective enforcement of the Agreements. It should be pointed out, however, that the Soviet Union voted for the resolution only after it found no support for its so-called "clarifying amendments," the most important effect of which would have been to have limited the Secretary-General to making a survey of the situation in the area rather than taking any remedial steps which might strengthen the enforcement machinery of the Armistice Agreements.

Two months later, in June 1956, when the Security Council considered the Secretary-General's report on his negotiations, the Council consid-

ered a resolution sponsored by the United Kingdom which generally endorsed the Secretary-General's actions and recommendations and requested him to continue his good offices with the parties. The Soviet Union voted *for* the resolution but not until after it had insisted on an amendment whereby the Secretary-General's good offices should not exceed those conferred on him by the Council's earlier resolution of April 4.

The record shows that it has been the objective of the Soviet Union that, if United Nations mechanisms in the Arab-Israel dispute did not involve Soviet participation, those mechanisms should be as nearly restricted and ineffective as possible.

As an illustration of Soviet efforts to participate in United Nations action in the area, it is worth noting that in 1948, after having abstained in the Security Council on the establishment of the Conciliation Commission and having opposed in the General Assembly the establishment of the Mediator, the Soviet Union suddenly became very anxious to contribute military observers to the corps of observers already set up in the Truce Supervision Organization. The Soviet Union became so persistent in this regard that it finally tabled a resolution on June 15, 1948, providing for the increase of military observers attached to the United Nations Mediator by some 30 to 50 observers. The Soviet Union indicated that at least five of these observers should come from the Soviet Union. The resolution easily failed to carry.

Now I would turn briefly to one last, but thoroughly cynical, aspect of Soviet posture in the United Nations. Though posing as champions of the downtrodden peoples, the Soviet Union has never given one single ruble to the United Nations agency for the relief and rehabilitation of the nearly one million Arab refugees!

I have perhaps bored you with details, but, where details become an indictment, they should be heeded. I think that for our purpose here tonight, however, it is sufficient to reiterate that the records of the Security Council and the General Assembly make crystal clear that over the years the Soviet Union has not wanted agreement which would lead to a settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute. It has, in its minority—although veto-powerful—position in the Security Council, diligently pursued this objective. It has

taken sides, it has shifted sides, in order that the dispute might continue. Where no agreement is possible, Soviet intrigue can prosper. Therefore, lack of agreement is an essential of Soviet strategy.

Debate on Suez Crisis

I personally shall never forget how clearly this point was brought to light by the debate in the Security Council last October on the Suez Canal crisis. At that time the then Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Shepilov, during the course of debate recommended that the solution of this Suez crisis (which had then been going on for some months) could best be sought through the establishment of a committee of nations, the most important requisite of which would be "that the composition of the Committee be balanced in such a way as to forestall the prevalence of some one point of view." Secretary Dulles exposed this proposal most effectively, I thought. In a subsequent speech in the Council, he stated:

He [Mr. Shepilov] obviously believes it unfortunate that 18 nations, representing over 90 percent of the traffic and a diversified user interest, could agree upon a solution. So he wants to make a fresh start by establishing a committee which is so constituted that we can know in advance that it will never agree!

It is not without precedent that a government feels that it can gain by perpetuating controversy. We have a proverb about "fishing in troubled waters." But it is usually considered respectable to veil such purpose. Rarely has a scheme to perpetuate controversy been so candidly revealed.

After this doleful recital of Soviet strategy, the critics may again scoff and contend that this recital of facts just proves that the United Nations is of little or no value. I say, let the critics scoff! Our belief in the United Nations is justified. Despite all the postures, positions, strategies, and tactics of the Soviet Union in the Arab-Israel dispute, the Security Council and the General Assembly have been able to stop the fighting in the area and have been able to build up a jurisprudence and the machinery for insuring that, however unsatisfactory the Armistice Agreements may be in leading to the stability of the security and peace of the area, they are in the main enforced. The parties to the dispute are well aware of the weight of world opinion represented by a majority in the Security Council and the General Assembly and that the ultimate goal of peace with

justice in the area will not be frustrated by a Soviet veto.

Finally, it cannot be stressed too much that the United Nations is a means whereby the free world can and must unite its strength through learning together. The Soviet rulers, who work best in the dark, may often wish that their record in the United Nations could be hidden, but it cannot. We, as free people, are learning from this record something of the designs against our freedom. We can learn together the fact that the Soviet rulers are still more concerned about satellites here on earth than about those in the sky. Let us hope that all who love freedom will, in time, learn together through the medium of the United Nations the threat to their freedom. In so doing, free peoples everywhere will be enabled to live together in united strength.

U.S. and Sudan To Negotiate Mutual Security Agreement

Press release 649 dated December 3

The Government of the United States and the Government of the Republic of Sudan have agreed to enter into negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement providing for extension of economic and technical assistance by the United States to the Republic of Sudan under the Mutual Security Act. It is expected that the negotiations will commence in the near future.

U.S. To Issue Passports to Relatives of Americans Held in Communist China

Press release 656 dated December 6

Following consideration of renewed requests from certain relatives of Americans imprisoned in Communist China for passports in order to visit them, the Department of State has decided to issue passports, not restricted as regards travel to Communist China, to such close relatives as apply for passports for this purpose.¹

¹ At the time when families of U.S. fliers imprisoned in Communist China were invited by Chinese Communist authorities to visit the prisoners, the Department released a letter from Secretary Dulles to these families on the subject of such visits. For text, see BULLETIN of Feb. 7, 1955, p. 214.

From the day of their imprisonment the release of the Americans held in Communist China has been a major foreign-policy objective of the U.S. Government. The United States has sought the assistance and good offices of friendly governments, and since June 5, 1954, representatives of the United States have met with Chinese Communist representatives more than 80 times at Geneva to seek their release. What seemed to be a satisfactory solution was reached on September 10, 1955, when the Chinese Communists in a public announcement agreed to permit all Americans to return expeditiously to the United States.² More than 2 years have passed since that time, but the Chinese Communists are still holding six of our citizens in prison.³

The Chinese Communists have, on various occasions, expressed a willingness to allow relatives of imprisoned Americans to visit them. The Department of State, in view of the prolonged and tragic separation of these six men from their families despite all efforts to bring about their release, is prepared to issue to members of their immediate families passports not restricted as regards travel to Communist China. However, in line with the basic policy toward communism in China, as stated by the Secretary of State in his address at San Francisco, June 28, 1957,⁴ it remains the general policy of the Government not to issue passports for travel to Communist China.

Albanian Independence Day

Press release 646 dated November 27

The celebration of Albanian Independence Day on November 28 is a tribute to the spirit of liberty and independence of the Albanian people over the centuries, commemorating as it does both the declaration of Albanian independence by its national hero, Skanderbeg, in 1443 and Albania's reemergence as a modern state 5 centuries later through the proclamation of its independence at Vlore on November 28, 1912.

² For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 19, 1955, p. 456.

³ For a Department announcement concerning the imprisoned Americans, see *ibid.*, Feb. 18, 1957, p. 261. The six Americans still held are John Thomas Downey, Richard G. Fecteau, Robert McCann, the Rev. Joseph Patrick McCormack, Hugh F. Redmond, Jr., and the Rev. John Paul Wagner.

⁴ *Ibid.*, July 15, 1957, p. 91.

The longstanding friendship of the American and Albanian people has sprung from the natural sympathy of the United States with the aspirations of the Albanian people for freedom and independence. At the end of the First World War President Wilson championed Albania's right to national independence, and during World War II the United States was one of the foremost advocates of the restoration of Albanian independence. Today the United States continues to support the right of the Albanian people to freedom and independence, which will again insure Albania its rightful place in the community of nations.

United States Gives \$7 Million to Malaria Eradication Campaign

Following is a Department announcement, with background information (press release 652), concerning the U.S. contribution on December 5 of \$7 million to worldwide malaria eradication programs, together with the texts of statements made by Secretary Dulles, Dr. Fred L. Soper, Director of the Pan American Sanitary Organization, and Dr. M. G. Candau, Director General of the World Health Organization, on the occasion of the presentation of the U.S. contribution.

PRESENTATION CEREMONY

Secretary Dulles on December 5 presented two checks totaling \$7 million to representatives of two international health organizations as a part of this country's voluntary contribution to a 60-nation worldwide malaria eradication program.

Dr. M. G. Candau, Director General of the World Health Organization, received a check for \$5 million on behalf of his organization, and Dr. Fred L. Soper, Director of the Pan American Sanitary Organization, which serves as the regional office for the Americas of the World Health Organization, received a check for \$2 million for their special malaria eradication funds.

These sums are part of the \$23,300,000 which the United States is contributing this year for this purpose. The remaining \$16,300,000 will be spent through the International Cooperation Ad-

ministration's programs in countries to which the United States is providing direct assistance.

In a brief statement Mr. Dulles stressed the continuing American interest in the humanitarian goals of international organizations and cited the present contribution as a concrete example of this interest. Dr. Candau and Dr. Soper thanked the Secretary for the U.S. contributions and described the programs which their organizations have undertaken in this field.

BACKGROUND

U.S. contributions of \$5 million to the World Health Organization and \$2 million to the Pan American Sanitary Organization represent U.S. participation, for fiscal year 1958, in the international effort at malaria eradication. Some 60 nations are taking part in this all-out attack on the number-one disease problem of the world. In bilateral health programs with 21 nations, the United States also is contributing extensively to the same goal of eradication.

Malaria affects about 200 million human beings a year and causes about 2 million deaths. In addition to the human misery it produces, its economic toll is very large—in low labor efficiency, high absentee rates, low rate of capital investment, neglect of natural resources, and costs of sickness. This toll is heaviest on newly developing countries which today need all available economic resources to make progress in living standards. Yet even the United States does not escape some of these costs, since it is estimated that there is a "hidden" 5 percent increase in the price of the products the United States imports from these countries as the result of malaria.

Recent antimalaria campaigns have shown that malaria can be eradicated, not merely "controlled." Eradication has been virtually accomplished in the United States, Puerto Rico, Venezuela, and Italy, and large areas of the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, and other countries.

The key factor is "residual" spraying with DDT and other insecticides. This procedure does not involve killing large numbers of mosquitoes or destroying their breeding places. It instead gives protection to human habitations and kills the mosquitoes that come near human beings. Walls of houses and other surfaces are sprayed, usually twice a year, and the mosquitoes, which

come to feed on human beings and transmit malaria in the process, are killed when they rest on walls before or after feeding.

With continued spraying for perhaps 4 years and treatment of existing malaria cases with drugs, malaria in effect is wiped out, for there is less and less malaria that can be transmitted. Malaria campaigns then become only surveillance programs—checking to discover cases of malaria and preventing transmission.

Attempts to "control" malaria have gone on for 50 years or more and with considerable success. With the use of DDT, however, eradication came to be considered, and at the 1948 International Congress on Malaria and Tropical Diseases, held in Washington, several scientific papers dealt with the idea of eradication, as contrasted to "control."

Launching of Program

At the 14th Pan American Sanitary Conference, which met in Chile in 1954, the American Republics decided to launch a program for eradication of malaria from the Western Hemisphere. At the WHO meeting in Mexico in 1955, all nations represented at the meeting endorsed the idea of worldwide eradication. The present activities are the result of these decisions.

What is sought is eradication of the disease from virtually all malarious areas except for Africa south of the Sahara and a few other presently inaccessible places. The plan is to proceed in individual countries to create malaria-free areas and ultimately to have these overlap with others within the individual nation and with those in adjoining nations.

Under technical cooperation programs, the United States has already assisted many other nations in organizing antimalaria activities and in equipping spraying teams, obtaining supplies of DDT, and setting up laboratories. These efforts will be continued in bilateral programs.

The international effort will be carried out over a 5-year period. For fiscal year 1958, the total expenditure of the United States and 60 other nations, plus the international organizations, is estimated at \$107.2 million.

Nations where malaria activities center will provide about \$61 million. The U.S. contribution, to WHO, PASO, and bilateral programs, is \$23.3 million. WHO and UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund) will spend an addi-

tional \$10 million, and \$12.9 million will come from loans of local currency under U.S. Public Law 480 (Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act) and other programs. It is hoped that other members of the WHO and PASO will make voluntary contributions to the special malaria funds of these organizations.

The first years of the program will emphasize a "tooling up," organizing campaigns and obtaining needed supplies and equipment. Antimalaria activities will reach a peak in the third or fourth year and then taper off. Surveillance programs, on a much more limited scale and within the normal public health programs of various nations, will follow.

Economic Results

Very important economic results can be predicted with virtual certainty on the basis of what has already occurred.

For example, in India an important agricultural area called the "terai," in northern India, was long neglected because of prevalence of malaria. After a 4-year campaign, the area of cultivated land increased from 38,800 acres to 162,000 acres, and food-grain production was up 130 percent.

In Venezuela, the Creole Petroleum Company, maintaining a camp for 1,400 employees, lost \$400,000 because of malaria. A DDT campaign, costing \$50,000 a year, was started in 1947, and in 2 years malaria virtually disappeared.

In Greece, malaria cases formerly numbered 2 million a year, and Greece spent \$1.2 million a year to buy quinine to treat malaria patients. An antimalaria campaign from 1946 to 1951 reduced the number of cases to about 10,000 and resulted in the saving of 30 million man-days annually. Greece's quinine-purchasing unit was disbanded.

In Ceylon, an incidence of 41.2 percent in 1946 was reduced to less than one-half of 1 percent by 1954 as a result of control operations. Ceylon was able to bring an additional 200 square miles of land under cultivation.

On the island of Negros, in the Philippines, malaria incidence has been reduced by 85 percent. On a road construction job in Mindanao, malaria control resulted in a saving of about \$160,000 on one contract alone.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY DULLES

Press release 654 dated December 5

This ceremony symbolizes a purpose to which American policy is dedicated. That purpose is to harness together in a joint effort the total capabilities of freedom-loving peoples to achieve a lasting peace with justice and to lift from the backs of mankind the burdens of poverty, hunger, and disease.

Therefore, it is most fitting that the United States today should join with the World Health Organization and the Pan American Sanitary Organization in a unified campaign to eradicate what is possibly the greatest single source of death and sickness in the world today.

This is malaria.

Last year, malaria attacked some 200 million people. Some 2 million died of the disease.

Through these deaths and the weakened condition of those who survived, malaria left its trail of personal tragedy and of adverse effects on industry, agriculture, education, economic progress. Each year millions of man-hours of productive labor are lost due to malaria.

Our own nation has suffered acutely from this disease. Until recent years malaria cost the United States over \$500 million a year and an unmeasurable amount of human misery. Our country has now rid itself of this scourge.

Yet today, more than 600 million persons in the world are still exposed to this killing and debilitating disease.

The United States, in accordance with President Eisenhower's recommendation to the Congress,¹ agreed with the goal of malaria eradication set by the 1955 Assembly of the World Health Organization. The United States, therefore, proposes that we and other nations join together to strengthen and expand our bilateral, regional, and other international efforts to relieve humanity and the economies of the nations of the burden imposed by malaria. The emphasis must shift from the control of malaria to its eradication.

We know it can be done. Advances in medical science have demonstrated that it is now technically possible to eradicate malaria from the face of the earth.

¹For text of the President's message to Congress on the mutual security program for 1958, see BULLETIN of June 10, 1957, p. 920.

But to capitalize on this unique opportunity, nations and international organizations must act in concert now and should increase their contributions of funds and skills to this great work. If the world does not immediately seize this opportunity, the opportunity may well be lost. A major campaign, energetically pressed on all fronts, is imperative. The campaign must be completed before the malaria-carrying mosquito becomes resistant to modern insecticides.

In these times when so much of the world's attention is focused on the terrifying, destructive inventions of science, the United States Government is particularly pleased to dedicate a full portion of its scientific knowledge and financial resources, in cooperation with those of the splendid organizations you represent, to an all-out effort for the peaceful and constructive benefit of mankind.

To this end, on behalf of the people of the United States, I present to you, Dr. Candau, as Director General of the World Health Organization, a check for \$5 million, and to you, Dr. Soper, as Director of the Pan American Sanitary Organization, a check for \$2 million, to be applied toward malaria eradication.

STATEMENT BY DR. SOPER

It is with a deep sense of gratitude that I accept this contribution of the United States of America to the Malaria Eradication Fund of the Pan American Sanitary Organization.

I am especially happy to be able to report at this time that all of the malarious countries and territories of the Americas are participating or are actively planning participation in 1958 in the malaria eradication program for the Western Hemisphere, approved by the 14th Pan American Sanitary Conference in Santiago, Chile, in 1954.

It must be emphasized that this inter-American program has since 1955 been part of the larger program for the world approved by the eighth World Health Assembly in Mexico City.

The bold, imaginative project for the eradication of malaria approved by the governing bodies of the Pan American Sanitary Organization and the World Health Organization is most difficult and costly. It has become a practical, operative program only through the recognition by your

Government of its importance and the assumption of responsibility for its success by technical and financial assistance to all of the agencies collaborating in this joint undertaking.

STATEMENT BY DR. CANDAU

On behalf of the World Health Organization I have the honor to accept this generous contribution from the Government of the United States of America to WHO's Malaria Eradication Special Account.

As you have indicated, Mr. Secretary, malaria is one of the gravest public health problems in the world today. And it is our firm belief that in this shrinking world the health of any one country is not only our common concern, but it is reflected in the greater well-being of all.

Certain regions of the world are particularly afflicted with the scourge of malaria. In only three countries in Asia, namely, Pakistan, India, and Indonesia, there are some 500 million persons living in malarious areas exposed to the danger of infection.

Most significant is your contribution today, but we must recognize that it is only a part of the broad financial help the United States is giving, through WHO and PASB regular programs, the United Nations Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, through UNICEF, and especially through the bilateral programs, toward the solution of the problem of malaria and of many other health problems throughout the world.

As important as this contribution is, Mr. Secretary, I would like to emphasize that there is a far more significant contribution from the United States of America—the making of its great technical knowledge available to the whole world.

It is gratifying to record the splendid cooperation that exists between the WHO and the International Cooperation Administration—a clear demonstration of our common goal, that of improving health conditions all over the world. And in improving health conditions we are building a firmer foundation for permanent peace and security.

These new funds, Mr. Secretary, should greatly encourage and stimulate nations everywhere to get on with the job—the eradication of malaria from the face of the earth.

Review of 12th Session of Contracting Parties to GATT

Press release 653 dated December 5

The 37 countries which are Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ended their 12th session on November 30 at Geneva. In 6 weeks of intensive work they completed action on a number of important trade issues and began a thorough examination of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (EEC), which is also known as the European Common Market Treaty. Arrangements were made to continue this study during the next year.

Among topics discussed this year were several programs for economic integration, of which the EEC was the most important. In addition the following were discussed: restrictions on imports maintained to protect foreign-exchange reserves; complaints of actions contrary to the provisions of the General Agreement; requests for waivers of obligations and reports on waivers granted in the past; special problems of trade, such as those peculiar to trade in primary commodities; and customs regulations.

Representatives of the countries which are members of the General Agreement meet annually to discuss problems which arise in connection with the application of the General Agreement in order to further the development of international trade. The General Agreement itself is made up of (1) a set of principles for fair international trade, and (2) lists of tariff obligations assumed by the Contracting Parties as a result of tariff bargaining sessions.

The EEC treaty was the most-discussed topic of the 6-week meeting and drew the most attention in addresses at the meeting of ministerial representatives from October 28 to 30, in the third week of the session. Representatives of 32 countries spoke during the 3 days set aside for the high-level debate.¹ It was recognized that entry into effect of the EEC treaty was of vital impor-

tance and that ways must be found under which the treaty and the General Agreement could complement each other in contributions to the expansion of international trade.

Thomas C. Mann, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, headed the U.S. delegation and represented the United States during the ministerial meetings.²

European Economic Community

The EEC treaty was signed by France, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg in March of this year. The process of ratification by the six countries is nearly completed, and it is expected that the treaty will become effective January 1, 1958. During a transitional period of 12 to 15 years, the six nations are to remove substantially all internal barriers to trade among themselves and move toward a common external tariff toward the rest of the world so as to arrive at a complete customs union at the end of that period.

The ministers in their addresses at the session recognized the historical importance and economic significance of the formation of the EEC; they also pointed out that certain problems might arise for the trade of nonmember countries in the course of implementation of the treaty. Detailed consideration of the provisions of the EEC treaty in the light of provisions of the General Agreement therefore began immediately after the ministerial meeting.

The examination covered particularly the arrangements provided for in the EEC treaty with respect to tariffs, the use of quantitative restrictions for balance-of-payments reasons, trade in agricultural products, and the association with the EEC of the members' overseas countries and territories, chiefly the African territories of France and Belgium.

¹ For text of a statement by Assistant Secretary Mann on Oct. 28, see BULLETIN of Nov. 25, 1957, p. 846.

² For an announcement of the U.S. delegation, see *ibid.*, Nov. 11, 1957, p. 768.

Extensive discussions were held on each of these matters during the session, and significant progress was made in clarifying the issues which might arise both during and after the transitional period. It was not possible to arrive at decisions or judgments with regard to these issues during the session, primarily because some of them depended on actions to be taken by the institutions of the Community. These institutions will not be set up until the treaty enters into force.

The Contracting Parties decided that the Intersessional Committee should continue the work started at this session in close cooperation with the institutions of the EEC. Because of the importance of the subject, all General Agreement countries will be represented on the Intersessional Committee during the period between the 12th and 13th sessions, although normally the committee is composed of delegates of about half of them. The committee is scheduled to meet on April 14, 1958, further to consider EEC treaty questions. It will report to the Contracting Parties at their 13th session in the fall of next year.

EURATOM Treaty

Discussion also took place at the 12th session on the trade aspects of the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). The EURATOM treaty, drafted and signed in conjunction with the EEC treaty by the same six nations, provides, among other things, for accelerated establishment of a common market with respect to certain materials and equipment for the production and use of nuclear energy. Only the trade provisions were considered, and it was decided that further consideration could take place along with the provisions of the EEC treaty.

European Free-Trade Area

In action on another aspect of European economic integration, the Contracting Parties agreed that the Intersessional Committee should follow developments with regard to the proposed European Free-Trade Area presently being negotiated in Paris. The FTA would associate the United Kingdom and other member countries of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation with the 6-nation EEC. The United States is an associated country of the OEEC and takes part in activities of the organization but is not a pro-

spective member of the proposed European Free-Trade Area. A free-trade area differs from a customs union (such as the EEC) in that, while both eliminate internal restrictions, only the customs union has a common external tariff. Each member of a free-trade area maintains its own tariffs against imports from nonmembers.

Other Economic Integration Programs

The Contracting Parties received the report submitted by the Government of Nicaragua concerning developments during the past year under its free-trade treaty with the Republic of El Salvador. The Nicaraguan delegate also reported that progress had been made toward creation of a 5-nation Central American free-trade area, although no treaty has yet been signed.

Detailed consideration of the Franco-Tunisian Customs Union was deferred to the 13th session.

Consultations on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions

The Contracting Parties completed a series of consultations on quantitative import restrictions imposed for balance-of-payments reasons. Twenty-one countries consulted on such restrictions, which they maintain in accordance with an exception to the general rule in the General Agreement against quotas.

This program of consultations, the first stage of which was held in June,³ was initiated as the result of a U.S. proposal accepted by the Contracting Parties at their 11th (1956) session. Because of amendments to the General Agreement which recently came into force for most countries, such consultations will, beginning in 1959, be held annually for industrialized countries and every other year for less developed countries.

In commenting on the results of the consultations, the U.S. representative at the session said his country was gratified at their success and at the spirit of cooperation with which the consulting countries entered into the consultations. A number of measures to eliminate import quotas were announced during the consultations, and there was broad agreement that the use of sound internal monetary and fiscal measures can frequently avert the need to resort to quantitative restrictions when faced with balance-of-payments difficulties.

³ *Ibid.*, July 22, 1957, p. 153.

As a result of the consultations, it was agreed that Germany was no longer entitled to maintain quantitative restrictions for balance-of-payments reasons. The German delegate presented a statement at the 12th session describing the program his Government intended to follow for eliminating balance-of-payments restrictions. Many delegates thought the program described was insufficient to fulfill Germany's obligations under the General Agreement. The German delegate undertook to transmit to the German Government these expressions of opinion.

Hard-Core Decision

The Contracting Parties extended for 1 year a 1955 decision to permit a country whose balance-of-payments situation had improved to such an extent that it no longer justified retention of quantitative controls on imports to maintain some of those controls on a decreasing basis and over a limited time. The decision was taken to permit such countries to ease the effect of a sudden withdrawal of such controls on domestic industries.

The Contracting Parties received the report of Belgium on its waiver under this decision and urged Belgium to hasten the process of eliminating the restrictions. Belgium has agreed that all such controls will be eliminated by 1961.

New Contracting Parties

At the 12th session Ghana and the Federation of Malaya, which acquired their independence in 1957, became the 36th and 37th Contracting Parties to the General Agreement.

This action was taken pursuant to the sponsorship of the United Kingdom under a provision by which a dependent territory to which the General Agreement has applied may automatically become a Contracting Party in its own right when it achieves autonomy in trade matters if it is sponsored by the former metropolitan country.

No time limit for such sponsorship is specified. To clarify rights and obligations of Contracting Parties toward such newly independent countries, the Contracting Parties agreed at the 12th session that they would continue to apply the provisions of the General Agreement in trade with such countries for a reasonable period of time if such treatment was reciprocated. In accordance with this recommendation, the Contracting Parties agreed to periods of 1 more year for Laos and

Cambodia and 2 more years for Tunisia; these three countries are former French territories.

With a view to becoming a Contracting Party, Switzerland will conduct tariff negotiations with most of the present Contracting Parties. It was agreed that the negotiations would take place at Geneva in 1958. The United States will not participate in the negotiations but will maintain reciprocal tariff concessions outside the General Agreement with Switzerland under a longstanding bilateral trade agreement.

Japan has now been a Contracting Party for over 2 years, but 15 General Agreement countries continue to invoke a provision (with respect to Japan) which permits a Contracting Party to withhold application of the General Agreement from a new Contracting Party. The problem of Japan's trade relations with the 15 countries was given further attention at the session. The United States and several other countries supported Japan's request that the General Agreement be made applicable between Japan and the 15 countries. Brazil, which had invoked this provision when Japan became a Contracting Party, reported that it is now applying the General Agreement fully toward Japan.

Tariff Adjustments

General changes in tariff schedules by four countries were discussed.

First, Finland was given authority to raise certain of its duties by an amount necessary to compensate for a devaluation of the finmark which took place earlier this year. Arrangements were included in the decision for Finland to consult with any Contracting Party which considers that raising the duty on a certain product will adversely affect its rights under the General Agreement.

Second, Brazil, which was granted a waiver last year to permit it to revise its tariff, will conduct negotiations with other Contracting Parties on the basis of its revised tariff early in 1958. The object of the negotiations is to give other Contracting Parties an opportunity to negotiate for concessions to replace those which Brazil is modifying or withdrawing as a result of the introduction of its new tariff.

Third, Cuba requested at the 12th session a waiver of certain of its obligations under the General Agreement to facilitate the introduction of a revised tariff. The Cuban request was made on

the basis that the tariff was antiquated and that a revision was necessary for the development and diversification of the Cuban economy. The Contracting Parties agreed to take account, in negotiations based on the new Cuban tariff, of the principle that a country which has bound a high proportion of its tariffs at very low rates of duty has less scope for negotiating. The Contracting Parties also granted Cuba a waiver to permit it to impose quantitative restrictions on imports to the extent necessary to forestall a flood of imports during the period before the new tariff becomes effective.

Fourth, certain adjustments will be made in the New Zealand tariff to modernize it. Where such adjustments result in increases of bound duties, New Zealand will negotiate the increases by giving equivalent new concessions to those countries most closely affected.

Since the end of 1957 marks the end of a period of about 3 years during which Contracting Parties agreed not to withdraw tariff concessions, several countries initiated negotiations to permit them to raise tariffs which they had previously bound. These negotiations were held in part concurrently with the 12th session. They will result in new tariff concessions to balance those withdrawn. A new period of 3 years during which concessions may not normally be withdrawn will begin on January 2, 1958.

Franco-German Treaty on the Saar

France and Germany presented their treaty covering their economic relations with the Saar to the Contracting Parties. Their normal obligation under the General Agreement to treat all Contracting Parties equally with regard to tariffs was waived to the extent necessary to implement the treaty. The waiver permits the two countries to give preferential treatment in trade with the Saar. The treaty was drawn up to ease the economic effects of the transfer of political responsibility for the Saar from France to Germany.

Primary Commodities

The particular problems of trade in primary commodities as a matter of great interest to the less developed countries received considerable attention during the session and particularly during the ministerial meeting. The less developed countries depend very largely on exports of

primary commodities, particularly agricultural goods, to maintain their positions in international trade. Considerable feeling was also expressed that the welfare of many of them was to some extent dependent on agricultural protection policies.

In recognition of the concern expressed in the course of the discussion on these matters, the Contracting Parties agreed to plans for establishing a group of internationally recognized, non-governmental experts who will be asked to prepare a report on past and current international trade trends and their implications. The report of the expert group will be considered by the Contracting Parties at their next session.

Surplus Disposal

A related subject of great interest, particularly to agricultural countries, was the report by the U.S. delegation on U.S. disposal programs for surplus agricultural products. The report emphasized the efforts made to insure that surplus disposals under Public Law 480 do not injure the trade of other producers of agricultural products, through consultations with them and a due regard for protecting normal commercial trade in the planning of disposals. A number of countries, while expressing appreciation for the efforts taken by the United States to solve the problem, stated that the consultation procedures could be made more effective.

Waiver Reports

The Contracting Parties received and examined reports on waivers of General Agreement obligations granted at previous sessions.

The six Western European countries which form the European Coal and Steel Community reported on developments in the last stages of the transitional period, which will end February 10, 1958. At that time, tariffs and other restrictions on the trade among them in coal and steel products will have been removed and the limited common market for more accommodations, a forerunner of the European Economic Community, will be completed.

The United States reported on action to restrict imports of agricultural products under section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, for which a waiver was granted in 1955. Such restrictions are imposed to prevent imports from materially

interfering with domestic price support and other agricultural programs.

Italy, Australia, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Czechoslovakia also reported on waivers granted to them.

Complaints

The Contracting Parties considered several complaints that countries were not fulfilling their General Agreement obligations.

As in earlier years, the Netherlands formally complained that action by the United States under the Agricultural Adjustment Act had impaired a concession by restricting imports of dairy products. The Netherlands was authorized to take equivalent action against the United States by restricting imports of wheat flour from the United States.

Sweden and Denmark entered a complaint against the United States in connection with an increase in the U.S. duty on spring clothespins.⁴ The United States had previously incurred an obligation with respect to that duty in tariff negotiations with Sweden and Denmark. The General Agreement permits increases in such duties under certain circumstances when it is shown that serious injury to a domestic industry is being caused or threatened by imports, but the two countries claimed that the conditions had not been fulfilled. If bilateral discussions with the two countries do not resolve the matter, the Intersessional Committee will set up a panel to look into it.

Germany announced during the session that it had settled a complaint it had previously raised against Greece. The complaint involved an increase in the Greek duty on long-playing phonograph records. Greece undertook to reduce the duty to an extent which was acceptable to Germany.

Two other complaints were resolved when delegates of France and Brazil reported that their Governments had taken the necessary action to remove certain taxes which were inconsistent with the General Agreement. The Contracting Parties took note of a French statement of its intention to reduce a tax which had been increased contrary to the General Agreement. Complaints entered by the United Kingdom that France and Italy dis-

criminated against imported agricultural machinery were referred to the Intersessional Committee.

Restrictive Business Practices

In consideration of a Norwegian proposal that the Contracting Parties draw up a supplementary agreement for the control of international restrictive business practices (cartels), the Contracting Parties directed that their Executive Secretary prepare a report on cartels and on national anti-trust legislation. The report will be presented to the Intersessional Committee, which will then decide what further action should be taken, if any, on the matter.

Among other items carried over to the agenda of the 13th session for further action was a proposal for the adoption of a recommendation to governments that they avoid further restrictions on freedom of contract in transport insurance and that they move toward reduction or elimination of these restrictions previously imposed.

Trade and Customs Regulations

The Contracting Parties adopted a recommendation on consular formalities designed to facilitate trade by eliminating unnecessary procedures. The Contracting Parties agreed to consider at the 13th session a draft recommendation on marks of origin. Action on the subject of determining the nationality of imported goods was deferred to the 13th session.

Amendments

Shortly before the opening of the session, amendments to the preamble and parts II and III of the General Agreement, which had been negotiated in 1955, became effective for those countries which had accepted them, including the United States. The Contracting Parties took a number of actions as a result of the amendments coming into force and recommended that certain other protocols and the agreement on the Organization for Trade Cooperation be accepted and brought into effect.

Election of Officers

Early in the session the Contracting Parties elected L. K. Jha of India for a 1-year term as their chairman to succeed Sir Claude Corea of

⁴ *Ibid.*, Dec. 16, 1957, p. 958.

Ceylon. Mr. Jha is the Special Secretary in the Indian Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Fernando Garcia-Oldini of Chile and Heinz Standenat of Austria were elected vice chairmen, with Emmanuel Treu of Austria as Dr. Standenat's alternate.

The Contracting Parties agreed to meet for their 13th session on October 16, 1958.

President Increases Tariff on Imported Safety Pins

White House press release dated November 29

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

The President on November 29 accepted the recommendation of the U.S. Tariff Commission and issued a proclamation raising the rate of duty on imports of safety pins under the "escape clause" of the Trade Agreements Extension Act.

The rate of duty prescribed by the President's proclamation is 35 percent ad valorem and will become effective December 30, 1957. This action rested upon the finding of the U.S. Tariff Commission under the "escape clause" that the domestic safety-pin industry is being seriously injured by imports. The Commission reported its findings and recommendation on January 30, 1957. On March 29, 1957, the President requested the Commission to provide certain additional information.¹ The Commission submitted its supplementary report on September 30, 1957.²

PROCLAMATION 3212³

MODIFICATION OF TRADE AGREEMENT CONCESSION AND ADJUSTMENT OF RATE OF DUTY ON SAFETY PINS

1. WHEREAS, pursuant to authority vested in the President by the Constitution and the statutes, including section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (19 U. S. C. 1351), on October 30, 1947 he entered into a trade agreement with certain foreign countries, which trade agreement consists of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the related Protocol of Provisional Application thereof, together with the Final Act Adopted at the Conclusion of the Second Session of the Preparatory Com-

mittee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment (61 Stat. (Parts 5 and 6) A7, A11, and A2051);

2. WHEREAS item 350 in Part I of Schedule XX (Geneva—1947) annexed to and made a part of the said General Agreement reads in pertinent part as follows:

Tariff Act of 1930, paragraph	Description of products	Rate of duty
350	Pins with solid heads, without ornamentation, including hair, safety, hat, bonnet, and shawl pins; and brass, copper, iron, steel, or other base metal pins, with heads of glass, paste, or fusible enamel; all the foregoing not plated with gold or silver, and not commonly known as jewelry: Safety pins.....	22½% ad val.

3. WHEREAS, in accordance with Article II of the said General Agreement and by virtue of Proclamation No. 2761A of December 16, 1947 (61 Stat. 1103), the United States rate of duty applicable to safety pins described in the said item 350 is 22½ per centum ad valorem, as specified in the said item 350, which duty reflects the tariff concession granted in the said General Agreement with respect to such product;

4. WHEREAS, the United States Tariff Commission has submitted to me a report of its investigation No. 53 under section 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, as amended (19 U. S. C. 1364), on the basis of which investigation, including a hearing held in connection therewith, the Commission has found that as a result in part of the duty reflecting the concession granted in the said General Agreement safety pins described in the said item 350 are being imported into the United States in such increased quantities, both actual and relative, as to cause serious injury to the domestic industry producing like or directly competitive products;

5. WHEREAS the said Tariff Commission has recommended that the concession granted in the said General Agreement with respect to the safety pins be modified to permit the application to such safety pins of the increased rate of duty hereinafter proclaimed, which duty the said Tariff Commission found and reported to be necessary to remedy the serious injury to the domestic industry producing like or directly competitive products;

6. WHEREAS section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, authorizes the President to proclaim such modifications of existing duties or such additional import restrictions as are required or appropriate to carry out any foreign trade agreement that the President has entered into under the said section 350; and

7. WHEREAS, upon modification of the concession granted in the said General Agreement with respect to safety pins as recommended by the Tariff Commission, it will be appropriate, to carry out the said General Agreement, to apply to the said pins the rate of duty hereinafter proclaimed:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, President of the United States of America, acting under the au-

¹ BULLETIN of Apr. 29, 1957, p. 701.


² Copies of the Commission's report may be obtained from the U.S. Tariff Commission, Washington 25, D.C.

³ 22 Fed. Reg. 9687.

thority vested in me by section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, and by section 7(c) of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, as amended, and in accordance with the provisions of the said General Agreement, do proclaim that, effective after the close of business on December 30, 1957, and until the President otherwise proclaims, the said item 350 in Part I of Schedule XX (Geneva—1947) shall be modified by substituting the rate "35% ad val." for the rate "22½% ad val."

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this twenty-ninth day of November in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and fifty-seven, and of the Independence of the [SEAL] United States of America the one hundred and eighty-second.



By the President:

JOHN FOSTER DULLES
Secretary of State.

Philippines and Belgian Congo Receive World Bank Loans

LOAN TO PHILIPPINES

The World Bank on November 22 announced the signing of its first loan to the Philippines—the equivalent of \$21 million in various currencies. The borrower is the National Power Corporation, and the funds will be used for the Binga hydroelectric project in the island of Luzon.

The Bank of America N.T. & S.A. and the Chase Manhattan Bank are participating in the loan, without the World Bank's guaranty, to the extent of \$987,000. This amount, which represents the first four maturities of the loan falling due from December 1960 through June 1962, will be equally divided between the two participating banks.

The project calls for the construction of a dam and reservoir on the Agno River in northern Luzon, an underground power house with an installed capacity of 100,000 kilowatts, and transmission lines to Manila about 120 miles to the south and to various provincial areas. Work has

already begun and is expected to be completed in 1960.

The Philippines possesses very large unused water power resources. Of the total potential of at least 600,000 kilowatts in Luzon, only about one-sixth has so far been exploited. Binga is the second of six projects planned to develop the hydroelectric potential of the Agno and Toboy Rivers. The first project, located at Ambuklao a few miles from Binga, was brought into service with a capacity of 75,000 kilowatts a year ago.

LOAN TO BELGIAN CONGO

The World Bank on November 27 announced a loan equivalent to \$40 million for road construction and improvement forming part of the Ten-Year Plan for the development of the Belgian Congo. The loan will cover the cost of imported equipment, materials, and services required for work on the highway system during the 4 years 1957-60.

The project, estimated to cost the equivalent of \$70 million, involves the construction of 1,200 kilometers (750 miles) of new highways, the improvement of 900 kilometers (560 miles) of existing roads, and preparation for mechanized maintenance of a further 3,300 kilometers (2,060 miles). One of the new highways will provide an all-weather link between Léopoldville, the capital, and the Atlantic Ocean port of Matadi, passing through an agricultural region offering opportunities for larger food production; another will connect important mining centers in the province of Katanga; a third will provide access to the East African Railways in Uganda for shipment of exports through the Indian Ocean port of Mombasa. Improvement of the road from the northeastern highlands to Stanleyville on the Congo River will facilitate the marketing of coffee and rubber for export and foodstuffs for local consumption.

Improved road transport is urgently needed to encourage the change from subsistence agriculture to cash-crop cultivation, to open up tracts of unused land, and to allow for further growth of industrial employment. The bank's loan will provide assistance in this sector and at the same time help to maintain the rate of expenditure on the Ten-Year Plan.

U.N. Representative for India and Pakistan Asked To Recommend Action in Kashmir Dispute

Following are four statements made in the Security Council by Ambassador James J. Wadsworth, Deputy U.S. Representative to the United Nations, during debate on the India-Pakistan question, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the Council on December 2.

STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 25

U.S./U.N. press release 2785

Last February the Council gave to one of its members—Ambassador Jarring—a delicate and important task. I want to express the appreciation of the United States delegation for the outstanding manner in which he carried it out.¹ We are fortunate to have the benefit of his review of this highly complex question. It cannot fail to help the Council decide how it can best aid in finding a settlement acceptable to both parties. There was a long interval in the Council's consideration of this question between December of 1952 and January of 1957. Ambassador Jarring's recent discussions with Pakistan and India shed light on the current problems and help us view the situation in perspective.

We find one aspect of Ambassador Jarring's report² particularly encouraging. Both parties have again declared their desire to find a peaceful solution to the problem and again have declared their willingness to cooperate with the United

Nations to this end. More recently they have given the Council the same assurances. In this atmosphere the Council should continue, therefore, to assist the parties in finding a just and equitable solution to this longstanding and difficult problem.

I would like to turn now to the specific situation with which the Council is confronted.

It may be useful at the outset to recapitulate the main lines of Ambassador Jarring's report, because it is from that report that our current sessions start. The representatives of India and Pakistan during our discussions early this year indicated that they continue to recognize their international obligations under the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) resolutions of August 13, 1948, and January 5, 1949.³ Ambassador Jarring therefore based his mission on these statements of the parties, and he made it his task to explore what was impeding the implementation of the UNCIP resolutions.

He tells us that the Government of India laid emphasis on two restraining factors, one relating to the cease-fire order, the other to the truce agreement. India further stated that it was premature to discuss the implementation of those parts of the 1948 resolution dealing with the truce agreement and the plebiscite until the cease-fire order was fully implemented. The Government of Pakistan, on the other hand, maintained that the cease-fire order had been implemented by it in good faith and in full. It believed the time had come to proceed to the implementation of the truce agreement. In order to break this deadlock, Ambassador Jarring asked if the Governments would be prepared to submit to arbitration the question of whether the cease-fire order had been implemented. The Government of Pakistan accepted

¹ On Feb. 21, 1957, the Security Council adopted a resolution requesting the President of the Council, Gunnar V. Jarring, of Sweden, "to examine with the Governments of India and Pakistan any proposals which . . . are likely to contribute towards the settlement of the [Kashmir] dispute . . . ; to visit the sub-continent for this purpose; and to report to the Security Council not later than 15 April 1957 . . ." (BULLETIN of Mar. 18, 1957, p. 463).

² U.N. doc. S/3821.

³ Not printed.

this in principle; the Government of India did not feel that, as explained, arbitration would be appropriate. Ambassador Jarring was unable to break the deadlock and reported back to the Council.

We have now heard statements in the Council by the representatives of India and Pakistan. My delegation has given the most careful study to these statements. Insofar as they were related to the Jarring report, they have seemed to be further elaborations of the positions which are reflected in the report. Other issues and suggestions were also raised in these statements, on a number of which there were significant disagreements.

This is where the Council finds itself at the moment, and we are faced with the problem of selecting the most useful basis on which to proceed.

In this instance, unlike most problems which are brought before the Security Council, we are fortunate in having an area of agreement—and a large one—between the parties and with the Council. There are, of course, many complexities to the Kashmir question, and I do not in any way wish to minimize the difficulties lying in the way of reaching a final solution. We would delude ourselves if we did so. Nevertheless, there does exist in the UNCIP resolutions an agreement for resolving this conflict. That agreement calls for the following action: first, for the cease-fire order; second, for a truce agreement; third, for the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or to Pakistan to be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite.

These are the basic elements of the UNCIP resolutions, which both India and Pakistan accepted and which the Council has repeatedly endorsed. They are obligations which have been recognized by the parties for 9 years. And both parties have reaffirmed their recognition of these obligations before the Council this year, as Ambassador Jarring pointed out in his report. Under these circumstances the Council's most constructive contribution will undoubtedly be to help implement the UNCIP resolutions.

This, indeed, has been the primary task to which the past efforts of the Council and its agents—the UNCIP and the various representatives who have been sent to the subcontinent—have been directed for many years. In our view the Council's most

useful role at this time continues to be to proceed on this basis or this area of agreement, to seek to enlarge upon it, and to make it finally a reality. May I recall that on February 15, 1957, Ambassador Lodge stated in our previous discussion on this issue:⁴

The Security Council's overriding endeavor in connection with Kashmir has always been to secure an amicable settlement acceptable to both parties. In doing this it has sought to build upon the gains which have been made in the past and upon agreements which have been reached by the parties.

Now my delegation continues to believe that this is the best approach.

Now, on what aspects of the UNCIP resolutions do we mean to make progress? We mean to make, for one thing, progress toward demilitarization, or the implementation of the truce agreement. This has been the focus of every resolution of the Council since 1950. Most of Dr. Graham's work has also been concentrated on it. Prior to his last report, in fact, he was requested by the Security Council to enter into negotiations with the parties to reach final agreement on the specific number of forces which should remain on either side of the cease-fire line limits the Council had previously set. Dr. Graham submitted his report on this effort on 27 March 1953. Although he had put forward precise proposals, he did not succeed in reaching full agreement with the parties at that time. So that this important aspect in implementing the resolutions therefore remains before us.

I suggest that efforts to bring this about, and to achieve agreement on the forces to remain on each side of the cease-fire line, should be an important aspect of any further action we take. Surely, a reduction in the number of troops in the area would in itself be a forward step in improving relationships.

Secondly, there are the questions which have been raised about the status of implementation of the cease-fire order. Attention has been paid by both the Indian and Pakistani representatives in the Council to previous reports which touch upon this question, especially to Dr. Graham's third and fifth reports. A considerable portion of Ambassador Jarring's report also deals with his arbitration proposal on the question. In the light of this background it would seem desirable that the

⁴ BULLETIN of Mar. 18, 1957, p. 457.

Council include this as one of the issues on which it might take some action. An appropriate resolution might include an authorization for recommendations to be made on the cease-fire order if they should seem necessary.

Mr. President, the achievement of these objectives, requiring as it would the positive support and agreement of both India and Pakistan, is not easy. I do not suggest that we can complete the process at this session of the Council. We need again to call for assistance.

In our opinion fortunately, the United Nations has retained the services, as the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan, of Dr. Frank Graham. It would seem appropriate to us if the Council were to call upon him to consult again with the parties in order to bring about implementation of the UNCIP agreement along the lines I have indicated.

No one possesses a more intimate knowledge of the background and facts of this problem than Dr. Graham. I am confident that he can perform another valuable service for the Council and, more importantly, for India and Pakistan. I am hopeful that, if the Council decided to take this action, India and Pakistan would agree to receive him and to consult with him in good faith in an effort to reach an early agreement.⁵

In closing I would like to say this: One of the Council's overriding responsibilities on all questions is to maintain peace and security. Its efforts in this case to help the parties implement their commitments are based on a sincere desire to achieve stability and friendly relations between these two important countries.

In its first resolution, of January 17, 1948,⁶ the Security Council called upon India and Pakistan "to refrain from making any statements and from doing or causing to be done or permitting any acts which might aggravate the situation." Again in its first resolution the UNCIP also called upon the parties "to appeal to their respective peoples to assist in creating and maintaining an atmosphere favorable to the promotion of further negotiations." These requests, as well as others that the Council has adopted from time to time, are as pertinent today as when they were adopted. We call them again to the attention

of India and Pakistan, both of whom have expressed their intention to conform to these principles.

We believe that a final solution to this problem can only be of benefit to both parties. It is in this spirit that I have spoken. We have concentrated on the most favorable aspects of the issue in the hope that we may encourage progress toward its solution and an improvement in relations between these two great Asian countries.

Mr. President, we have made our comments in the hope that they will assist in finding a way to end the frustrations that have hitherto beset every effort to bring about a permanent and peaceful solution of this problem. We do not and should not despair at these difficulties. We should patiently and persistently continue our efforts until mutual agreement can be reached and the issues resolved. We believe that every constructive step toward a solution of this problem contributes to the maintenance of peace and stability.

We would also appreciate hearing the views of other members of the Council in regard to these important matters.

STATEMENT OF NOVEMBER 18

U.S./U.N. press release 2815

I have listened carefully to the remarks of the representative of India. I should like to reserve the right to comment after I have seen the text, although I must confess that my delegation regrets the tone he has seen fit to adopt. At this point I should like simply to introduce the draft resolution.

The Council is now coming to the completion of an extensive new debate on the Kashmir problem. The representatives of India and Pakistan have presented their respective cases. The members of the Council have expressed themselves on the issues and on the type of action they thought the Council should take. The representatives of India and Pakistan have had a further opportunity to comment subsequent to the observations of the members of the Council.

There is now before the Council a draft resolution proposed by Australia, Colombia, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, and the United States.⁷ This draft resolution is designed to give

⁵ For background on Dr. Graham's mission and a map of Kashmir, see *ibid.*, Oct. 27, 1952, p. 661.

⁶ For text, see *ibid.*, Feb. 1, 1948, p. 143.

⁷ U.N. doc. S/3911.

concrete expression to the views which were stated by most of the members of the Council. It is my purpose now to introduce the draft resolution.

The draft resolution begins with an expression of thanks and appreciation to Ambassador Jarring for his report and his helpful service to the Council in undertaking the missions we entrusted to him last February. Members of the Council, as well as the representatives of India and Pakistan, have reflected their confidence in him during the course of the discussion, and it is proper that he should be given recognition in the resolution.

The draft resolution then notes that the representatives of India and Pakistan have again indicated their willingness to cooperate with the United Nations in finding a peaceful solution to this problem. Ambassador Jarring informed us of this in his report, and both countries have reiterated it before the Council. This is an important fact. The differences between Pakistan and India over Kashmir were brought to the United Nations shortly after they first arose. The willingness to seek a solution through peaceful means—whether such peaceful means are agreed upon in this Council or between the parties or not—utilizing the conciliatory processes of the United Nations, is encouraging. It reflects the political maturity and sense of international community and responsibility of both states.

The next paragraph reflects an important element that has emerged from the discussions in the Council this year—the fact that both India and Pakistan continue to accept the UNCIP resolutions of August 13, 1948, and January 5, 1949. This position was stated by both of them in our discussions in February. Ambassador Jarring noted this fact and undertook to find a solution to the problems that had arisen in connection with their implementation. As we have stated before in this Council, the fact that Ambassador Jarring was not able to find such a solution should not be any reflection on his desire or on his ability to do so.

The representatives of the two Governments have reaffirmed that acceptance at this session of the Council and have expressed a desire to see progress made under them. I have been struck, in fact, by the great degree to which the speeches of both of them turned on problems of implementing these resolutions rather than the substance of the resolutions themselves.

Thus, even though there has been a passage of

time, even though the attitude has been expressed that conditions have changed and that we have heard about difficulties which have appeared in the past on implementation, this "area of agreement," which I mentioned in my first intervention, does remain.

I made the following statement during that first intervention:

In this instance, unlike most problems which are brought before the Security Council, we are fortunate in having an area of agreement—and a large one—between the parties and with the Council. There are, of course, many complexities to the Kashmir question, and I do not in any way wish to minimize the difficulties lying in the way of reaching a final solution. We would delude ourselves if we did so.

Nevertheless, there does exist in the UNCIP resolutions an agreement for resolving this conflict. That agreement calls for the following action: first, for a cease-fire order; second, for a truce agreement; third, for the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or to Pakistan to be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite.

These are the basic elements of the UNCIP resolutions, which both India and Pakistan accepted and which the Council has repeatedly endorsed. They are obligations which have been recognized by the parties for 9 years. And both parties have reaffirmed their recognition of these obligations [or, as the representative of India has repeatedly stated, "these engagements"] before the Council this year, as Ambassador Jarring pointed out in his report. Under these circumstances the Council's most constructive contribution will undoubtedly be to help implement the UNCIP resolutions.

I believe the debate has borne out this opinion.

I am sure that we all recognize that no final settlement of the Kashmir problem can be reached except on an amicable basis acceptable to both parties. It is quite impossible for this Council to push any sovereign nation into any action which it refuses to take. In the absence of some other mutually acceptable solution, the Security Council's clear responsibility, in our view, is to help the parties make these UNCIP resolutions a reality. While there may be strong differences of opinion—and there are—over which aspect of the resolutions is causing the most difficulty, those concerned certainly must, in the light of their engagements, agree that every effort should be made to make them effective.

The fact, of course, is that progress in this direction has been slow—one might say, almost nonexistent. The next paragraph refers to the Council's concern about this. The consistent view of the Council, expressed in its resolutions of March 14, 1950, March 30, 1951, November 10, 1951,

December 23, 1952, and February 21, 1957, that demilitarization is an important goal that would help toward a settlement, is then restated in the draft resolution. For we are still confident that a reduction in the number of troops in the area would in itself be a forward step in improving the relationships.

The final paragraph of the preamble recalls previous Security Council and UNCIP resolutions on this subject.

I now come to the operative paragraphs.

The first operative paragraph expresses a sentiment common to resolutions which the Council adopts on many issues. The actual language here comes from the first resolution of the Security Council on Kashmir and from the first UNCIP resolution. Both of these resolutions, as has been repeatedly said, were accepted by the parties. India and Pakistan have reiterated their intention to seek a peaceful solution and to adhere to a pacific approach. This request in the draft resolution before you accords with their own expressions of intentions. It is made with the earnest desire that both parties do their utmost to assure the most favorable conditions for friendly relations between them and for reaching a solution to this problem.

The second operative paragraph embodies concrete action that the Council should take to help bring about implementation of these resolutions which have been agreed to. It calls upon the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan to renew his efforts. It authorizes him, for one thing, to make any recommendation to the parties for further action which he considers desirable in connection with part I of the August 13, 1948, UNCIP resolution, having regard to his third and fifth reports and having regard to Mr. Jarring's report. We hope that through this means the questions which have been raised about the status of implementation of the cease-fire order can be resolved.

This paragraph goes on to request the United Nations Representative to enter into negotiations with India and Pakistan in order to implement part II. In particular, he is asked to seek agreement on a reduction of forces on each side of the cease-fire line down to a specific number, arrived at on the basis of the relevant Security Council resolutions and having regard to his fifth report. There is nothing new about having the Coun-

cil ask the United Nations Representative to make an attempt to implement part II.

Over the past years there have been extensive efforts to implement part II. Both India and Pakistan have previously consulted with the United Nations Representative to bring this about or to achieve "demilitarization," as it has most often been referred to recently.

Most of the United Nations Representative's work had been concentrated on this problem. It is clearly important for the Council to continue to lay stress on bringing this about. Agreement on a reduction of forces on each side of the cease-fire line would, we believe, help to reduce the tensions which have been reflected there, help bring about an "atmosphere favorable to the promotion of further negotiations," and help bring us nearer to a final solution of the Kashmir problem.

In the third operative paragraph the Governments of India and Pakistan are asked to extend their cooperation to the United Nations Representative and to cooperate in formulating early agreement on demilitarization procedures to be implemented within a 3-month period thereafter. Both Governments have extended their cordial cooperation to United Nations representatives in the past, and I am hopeful they will do so again.

Finally, we have not attempted to specify too narrowly or in too much detail how the United Nations Representative should carry out his mission. The draft resolution asks him to report "as soon as possible." It leaves him discretion in the manner in which he approaches his task. Dr. Graham has demonstrated his wisdom and ability in the past, and he can be relied upon to do an effective job now. In this he has the firm support of the United States Government.

In conclusion I would like to repeat one paragraph of my statement of October 25:

We believe that a final solution to this problem can only be of benefit to both parties. It is in this spirit that I have spoken. We have concentrated on the most favorable aspects of the issue in the hope that we may encourage progress toward its solution and an improvement in relations between these two great Asian countries.

STATEMENT OF NOVEMBER 28

U.S./U.N. press release 2825

I wish to associate my delegation with the spirit as well as the letter of the remarks just made by

the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom.

My delegation has also studied the amendments put forward by the distinguished representative of Sweden^{*} with great care, and we, too, appreciate to the full the helpful spirit in which he has made them.

However, my delegation would not be ready at this time to take a final decision as to its position on these amendments. As we have said before, we are anxious that anything we do here be in a spirit which can be accepted by both of the parties, and we, too, look forward with great interest to hearing from them when they have made their decisions concerning the amendments.

We feel that, if this amendment could be helpful in bringing about some reconciliation of views and in making it possible for the United Nations Representative to undertake the mission envisaged, we would certainly give it the most serious and favorable consideration.

STATEMENT OF DECEMBER 2

U.S./U.N. press release 2829

I would like to say first a few words in support of the Swedish amendments and now of the amended resolution and also briefly to exercise my right to reply in connection with the comments of the representative of the U.S.S.R. about the United States earlier in the discussion and, to a lesser extent perhaps, his comments today.

The burden of the complaint of the representative of the U.S.S.R. was that the United States gives military aid to Pakistan. Little else need be said about it other than that he sought to utilize this fact to convert the Security Council's consideration of the Kashmir problem from a serious attempt to solve a difficult problem into an exercise into power politics. The United States is glad to cooperate in a collective security arrangement with Pakistan, reasons for which are found in Soviet policies and actions. We are also glad to maintain friendly relations with India, a fact which was referred to by the Indian representative during our discussions in this Council. We are pleased that the Council has acted soberly and responsibly and has not been drawn into the cold-war atmosphere which the U.S.S.R. sought

to instill, and we sincerely hope that the adoption of the resolution which we have just passed will assist in bringing the Kashmir problem to a final solution.

We voted for the amendments of the representative of Sweden because we consider them consistent with the purpose of the original draft and because they seem helpful in enabling the parties to receive the United Nations Representative. As was the case with the original resolution, the amendment directs the United Nations Representative to seek to bring about implementation of the UNCIP resolution, and we continue to believe, Mr. President, that in continuing to do so it is important to make progress on demilitarization and the preamble continues to reflect this. The amendment is also directed toward achieving a peaceful settlement, and this is fully consistent with the reference in the preamble to the statements by both countries that this is what they desire. As we have said often, Mr. President—and we wish to reiterate again today—if a final solution is to be reached, it is fundamental that both parties must agree. The only agreed method of reaching a solution so far is set out in the UNCIP resolution. The reference to them in the preamble continues to reflect the common understanding on this point. We hope that Dr. Graham will have a successful trip to the subcontinent, and we hope both India and Pakistan will co-operate with him sincerely and earnestly in seeking to achieve the objectives of his mission.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION^{*}

U.N. doc. S/3922

The Security Council,

Having received and noted with appreciation the report of Mr. Gunnar V. Jarring, the Representative of Sweden, on the mission undertaken by him pursuant to the Security Council resolution of 21 February 1957,

Expressing its thanks to Mr. Jarring for the care and ability with which he has carried out his mission,

Observing with appreciation the expressions made by both parties of sincere willingness to co-operate with the United Nations in finding a peaceful solution,

Observing further that the Governments of India and Pakistan recognize and accept the provisions of its resolution dated 17 January 1948 and of the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan dated 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, which en-

^{*} U.N. doc. S/3920.

^{*} Adopted by the Security Council on Dec. 2 by a vote of 10-0. The U.S.S.R. abstained.

TREATY INFORMATION

Educational Exchanges Resumed With Republic of China

Press release 648 dated November 30

U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of China Karl L. Rankin and Acting Chinese Foreign Minister Shen Chang-huan exchanged notes on November 30 at Taipei which reactivate the program of educational exchanges between the two countries authorized by the Fulbright act. The program was initiated following the signing of the original agreement on November 10, 1947. It later became inoperative after the transfer of the seat of the Chinese Government to Taiwan.

The new agreement provides for the expenditure of Chinese currency in an amount equivalent to \$750,000 for the exchange of students, teachers, lecturers, and research scholars between China and the United States over a 3-year period. This currency has become available as the result of the sale of surplus agricultural products to China. Administration of the program will be facilitated by a reorganized binational agency known as the United States Educational Foundation in the Republic of China. The Foundation's board of directors will consist of eight members equally divided as to Chinese and United States nationality. The U.S. Ambassador will serve as the honorary chairman.

All recipients of awards under the program authorized by the Fulbright act are selected by the Board of Foreign Scholarships, the members of which are appointed by the President of the United States. The Board maintains a secretariat in the Department of State. Exchanges of persons under the Fulbright act are carried out as a regular part of the Department's International Educational Exchange Program. The purpose of the program is to further understanding between the United States and other countries through a wider exchange of knowledge and professional talents.

Thirty-nine countries have concluded agreements to participate in the educational exchange program initiated 10 years ago under authority of the Fulbright act. The act provides that cer-

visage in accordance with their terms the determination of the future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir in accordance with the will of the people through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite, and that Mr. Jarring felt it appropriate to explore what was impeding their full implementation,

Concerned over the lack of progress towards a settlement of the dispute which his report manifests,

Considering the importance which it has attached to demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir as one of the steps towards a settlement,

Recalling its previous resolution and the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on the India-Pakistan question,

1. Requests the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan to refrain from making any statements and from doing or causing to be done or permitting any acts which might aggravate the situation and to appeal to their respective peoples to assist in creating and maintaining an atmosphere favourable to the promotion of further negotiations;

2. Requests the United Nations representative for India and Pakistan to make any recommendations to the parties for further appropriate action with a view to making progress toward the implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 and toward a peaceful settlement;

3. Authorizes the United Nations representative to visit the sub-continent for these purposes; and

4. Instructs the United Nations representative to report to the Security Council on his efforts as soon as possible.

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography¹

Security Council

Report by the Acting Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization Relating to the Israel Complaint Dated 5 September 1957. Note by the Secretary-General. S/3913, November 18, 1957. 7 pp. mimeo.

General Assembly

Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation. Draft of the Report To Be Transmitted by the Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation to the General Assembly in 1958. Annex II to Chapter CD. A/AC.82/R.61/Add.5, October 25, 1957. 20 pp. mimeo.

Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation. Draft of the Report To Be Transmitted by the Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation to the General Assembly in 1958. Annex to Chapter G. A/AC.82/R.61/Add.6, October 31, 1957. 79 pp. mimeo.

¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

tain foreign currencies owed to or owned by the United States may be used to finance exchanges of persons between the United States and other countries for study, teaching, lecturing, advanced research, and other educational activities. China was the first country with which such an agreement was signed following approval of the legislation on August 1, 1946. A total of 148 persons were exchanged between the United States and China in the 2-year period before operations were suspended.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Protocol to amend convention for unification of certain rules relating to international carriage by air signed at Warsaw October 12, 1929 (49 Stat. 3000). Done at The Hague September 28, 1955.¹

Signature: Denmark, March 16, 1957.

Ratifications: Luxembourg, February 13, 1957; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, March 25, 1957; Mexico, May 24, 1957; Hungary, October 4, 1957.

Slavery

Protocol amending the slavery convention signed at Geneva September 25, 1926 (46 Stat. 2183), and annex. Done at New York December 7, 1953. Entered into force for the United States March 7, 1956 (TIAS 3532). *Signature:* Rumania, November 13, 1957.

BILATERAL

British Guiana

Agreement for the exchange of international money orders. Signed at Georgetown October 8, 1957, and at Washington November 4, 1957. Enters into force on a date to be agreed upon by the contracting parties. *Approved and ratified by the President:* November 29, 1957.

Cuba

Agreement providing guaranties against inconvertibility of investment receipts, authorized by sec. 413 (b) (4) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended (68

¹ Not in force.

Stat. 846-847; 70 Stat. 558, 22 USC 1933). *Effectuated* by exchange of notes at Habana February 4, 1957. Entered into force November 29, 1957 (date of confirmation by the Government of Cuba of acceptance in accordance with its constitutional procedures).

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Recess Appointments

The President on December 5 appointed Dempster McIntosh to be Manager of the Development Loan Fund in the International Cooperation Administration of the Department of State. (For biographic details, see press release 655 dated December 6.)

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: December 2-8

Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C. Releases issued prior to December 2 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 646 of November 27 and 648 of November 30.

No.	Date	Subject
649	12/3	U.S. and Sudan to negotiate aid agreement.
650	12/3	Dulles: BBC interview.
* 651	12/3	Dulles: appreciation to Governor Stevenson.
652	12/5	U.S. aid to malaria eradication programs.
653	12/5	Summary of 12th session of GATT.
654	12/5	Dulles: malaria eradication contribution.
* 655	12/6	Recess appointment of McIntosh (biographic details).
656	12/6	Passports for relatives of Americans held in Communist China.
† 657	12/6	Auerbach: "Recent Developments in the Immigration Field."
658	12/6	Coordination of mutual security programs.
* 659	12/6	Program for King Mohamed's visit to New York.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

December 23, 1957

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